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FETAL PROTECMION AND THE EXCLUSION OF
WOMEN FROM THE TOXIC WORKPLACE
ALLYSON K. DUNCAN*
Federal efforts to protect women in the workplace from discrimination
on the basis of their ability to bear children have had a tortured history.
From the Supreme Court's early decisions holding that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy does not constitute discrimination on the basis of
sex through an unequivocal legislative mandate that sex discrimination
includes distinctions on the basis of pregnancy and childbirth, Congress
and the courts have wrestled with the issue of the extent to which em-
ployers can legally protect or limit the rights of female employees of
childbearing age. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of
federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, has also
taken differing positions on the extent of an employer's obligations.
The resolution of the issue assumes particular significance in the con-
text of a workplace that grows increasingly polluted. Women as mothers
can be affected in two ways: hazardous substances in the workplace may
directly injure the fetus of a pregnant employee;, also, such substances
may affect the reproductive systems of non-pregnant females so that their
ability to conceive and bear healthy children is impaired. Employers fac-
ing the prospect of liability to injured mothers and offspring have sought
to protect themselves by the wholesale exclusion of women of childbear-
ing age from jobs which may present reproductive or fetal hazards.
However, such exclusions collide with the proscriptions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which make it illegal to discriminate on the
basis of sex in the making of employment decisions.'
Courts have yet to devise a workable solution to the conflict despite
the fact that the problem grows more acute. Although it is unclear how
many jobs are closed to women due to such health risks, the estimates are
high and the consensus is that the numbers are growing. In 1979, one
source indicated that at least 100,000 jobs were affected by exclusionary
policies.2 One year later, the EEOC estimated that as many as twenty
* Assistant Professor at NCCU School of Law. Former legal counsel,EOC.
I. 42 U. S. C. . §§ 2000e-2 (1982).
2. The Washington Post, November 3, 1979, § A at 6, col. 5, cited in Williams, Fring the
Woman to Protect the Fetur The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity
Goals Under 7tie VII, 69 Go. L . 641 (1981).
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million jobs may involve exposure to reproductive hazards.3 According
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 835,000
are affected by its standards for exposure to lead alone.4 The widespread
use of computers has recently been recognized as posing an as yet largely
unexplored threat. The July, 1988, issue of the American Journal of In-
dustrial Medicine reported a "significantly elevated risk of miscarriage"
among women who use video display terminals for more than twenty
hours per week during the first trimester of pregnancy.5
Three circuits have addressed the issue of the extent to which the ex-
clusion of women from certain jobs because of reproductive or fetal risk
violates Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination, and they have
reached inconsistent results. In October of 1988, the EEOC issued policy
guidance that departs significantly from its 1980 guidelines on the same
subject. The inconsistencies are due at least in part to the fact that tradi-
tional Title VII theory has proved inadequate to the analysis of the issue.
Title VII defenses have usually not been applied when a risk of harm to
someone other than the employee exists.
This paper will examine the inadequacy of current Title VII theories
and defenses for resolving the conflict between exclusionary fetal protec-
tion policies and the requirement that women not be discriminated
against in employment opportunities. Part I traces the historical devel-
opment of the treatment of pregnancy by Congress and the courts. Part
II considers the applicable Title VII theory and defenses as set forth in
the statute and developed through case law. Part III sets out the
EEOC's varying approaches to the resolution of the problem. Part IV
discusses deficiencies in the current analyses and proposes an alternative
approach.
PART I. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: A TITLE VII STEPCHILD
Title VII of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.6 Although neither the statute nor the legislative history
3. 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980).
4. OSHA News, 6 Job Safety and Health 2 (Dec. 1978), cited in 69 Geo. L J. at 647.
5. Goldfaber, The Risk of Miscarriage and Birth Defects Among Women Who Use Video Dis-
play Terminals During Pregnancy. 13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 695 (1988).
6. As enacted, Section 703(a) provided that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer
"(I) to fail or refuise to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.- 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 e-2(a) (1989).
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define the term "sex," the EEOC and the courts have consistently held
that "sex" equates to "gender," therefore Title VII does not protect, for
example, against discrimination on the basis of sexual preference.7
Initially, the narrow reading of the term "sex" carried over into the
area of pregnancy, and distinctions based on pregnancy were held not to
constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. This anal-
ysis had a constitutional underpinning. In Geduldig v. Aiello,' women
challenged the exclusion of normal pregnancies from coverage under a
state disability plan on the ground that it violated the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court held that pregnancy is an "objectively identifiable physical condi-
tion," and not a facial distinction based on sex. Therefore, pregnancy
distinctions were not entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny. According
to the Court, the disability plan divided the universe of potential recipi-
ents into two groups-pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.
Although the former group was exclusively female, the latter group in-
cluded members of both sexes. The Court felt that the lack of identity
between the excluded disability and gender defeated the sex discrimina-
tion claim. 9
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a similar
plan under Title VII. Rejecting the unanimous views of the six Circuit
Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue, the Supreme Court in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert found no gender-based discrimination in
the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under a private employer-
sponsored disability insurance program. 0 The Court relied on Geduldig
in finding that an employer could legitimately exclude pregnancy-related
disabilities from coverage as long as men and women were treated the
same with respect to the disabilities that were included. The fact that the
suit was brought under Title VII rather than the Constitution did not
change the result, despite the fact that Title VII analysis differs. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, where the allegation is that a neutral classi-
fication has a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group, the
plaintiff has to prove invidious motivation or purpose." On the other
hand, a prima facie violation of Title VII can be established on the basis
of the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral policy. 2 Based on the
rationale in Geduldig, the Gilbert court held that pregnancy distinctions
are not facially sex-based. The court then went on to consider whether
7. EEOC Dec. No. 76-75. [1976] Emp. Prac. Guide (CCI) 6495, at 4266; see aso, eg., De
Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 608 F2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
9. Id. at 496-97 n. 20.
10. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
11. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
12- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 421 (1976).
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they have a disproportionate effect for Title VII purposes, and concluded
that they do not. The Court stated that "... pregnancy-related disabili-
ties constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to
compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of
benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the
facially evenhanded under inclusion of risks.""
' 3
One year later, the Supreme Court acted to limit the holding in Gil-
bert. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty," the Court considered the validity
under Title VII of a policy denying accumulated seniority to employees
returning from maternity leave, but not from leave related to any other
disability. The Court found that the policy violated Section 703(a)(2)"5 .
Since under Geduldig and Gilbert pregnancy distinctions are not facially
gender-based, the Court found no per se violation of Title VII. However,
this plan, unlike the one in Gilbert, was held to have a discriminatory
effect: "[h]ere, by comparison, petitioner has not merely refused to ex-
tend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has
imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer."16
Despite the narrowing interpretation of Satty, Congress conclusively
resolved the issue of the illegality of pregnancy discrimination by amend-
ing Title VII in 1978 to include a new Section 701(k). The so-called
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), reads in partinent part:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or in-
ability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise...' 7
In enacting the PDA, Congress specifically rejected both the holding
and the reasoning of Gilbert.8 The proponents of the revision felt that
the Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the wording and pur-
pose of Title VII, and that the amendment was necessary to reestablish
the correct interpretation of the law that prevailed prior to Gilbert. 9
Thus, the PDA makes it clear that discrimination on the basis of preg-
13. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 (emphasis in original).
14. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
15. 703(aX2) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individuals of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1983).
16. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. at 142.
17. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e(k) (1983).
18. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
19. Id., citing S. Rep. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1977). Leg. Hist., at 39-40.
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nancy is facial discrimination on the basis of sex. The amendment, while
effectively resolving the Gilbert line of issues, leaves open the question of
the extent to which the pregnant female must be accommodated in the
toxic workplace.
PART II THEORIES OF AND DEFENSES TO SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION
The 1978 Amendment of Title VII included "pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions" within the meaning of the statutory terms
"because of sex", thus conclusively establishing that pregnancy distinc-
tions are facially gender-based. The question which then arises is
whether or not the distinctions are justified by some statutory or judi-
cially-created exception or defense.
Title VII recognizes two underlying theories of discrimination, each
with its own proof process and corresponding defense. These two theo-
ries track the two subheadings of the basic substantive provision of Title
VII, Section 703(a). Section 703(a) essentially prohibits two things: first,
hiring, firing, failing to promote and so on, on the basis of a prohibited
characteristic; in other words, an action directed specifically at an indi-
vidual or group of individuals; and second, limiting, segregating or classi-
fying employees in a way that tends to affect them adversely. The two
theories, called disparate treatment and disparate impact respectively,
can be illustrated as follows: if an employer refuses to hire women as
prison guards because he feels that they are physically incapable of func-
tioning in that capacity, then he is liable for disparate treatment. If the
employer imposes no overt sex barrier, but adopts a policy of hiring as
prison guards only individuals who are taller than 5'6" and weigh more
than 120 pounds, such a policy, while neutral on its face, would never-
theless have a disparate impact on the hiring of women.20
A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
Title VII itself creates an exception to the disparate treatment claim.
Section 703(e) provides that "notwithstanding any other provision of this
title.. .it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees.. .on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business."'"
The bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) has been consistently
20. This was the fact pattern in Dothard .Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), a seminal case in
disparate impact analysis.
21. 42 U.S.C, § 200Ne-2(e) (1982).
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interpreted by the EEOC and the courts as providing ". .only the nar-
rowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality of employment
opportunities. ' 22 Consistent with this strict interpretation is the fact that
the existence of a bfoq is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded
and proved.23 Courts have recognized two inquiries as relevant to this
analysis. The first is whether the position is one that affects the very
essence of the employer's business. In the words of the statute, it must be
"reasonably necessary" to its "normal operation." Some positions or
functions would be so peripheral to the employer's central mission that
no sexually discriminatory job qualifications would be justified. In Diaz
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., for example, the Fifth Circuit held
that while the presence of women exclusively may indeed have a soothing
affect on the traveling public, the policy of only hiring women as flight
attendants is not reasonably necessary to the business of transporting
passengers from one destination to another.24 Thus, the requirement
that the job involve the employer's central purpose functions as a kind of
sliding scale. The more intimately a job is associated with the nature of
the employer's business, and the higher the degree of public safety in-
volved in that business, the more leniency an employer will be allowed in
imposing sex-based job qualifications.
25
The second consideration in determining the existence of a bfoq is
whether the job qualification is "reasonably necessary" rather than
merely convenient. There are two ways to establish reasonable necessity.
The employer may show that it "had reasonable cause to believe, that is,
a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.26
Alternatively the employer may show that sex is a legitimate consider-
ation for a job by proving that it is "impossible or highly impractical" to
evaluate the ability of employees or. an individual basis and that a blan-
ket exclusion is therefore necessary." In either showing, the focus of the
22. Dothard v. Rawlinson. 433 U.S. at 333. See also n. 19, in which the court notes that "bt]he
EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination in 1965 reflecting its position that 'the bona fide occu-
pational qualification as to sex should be interpreted narrowly' 29 CFR § 1604.2(a). It has adhered
to that principle consistently, and its constriction of the statute can accordingly be given weighL"
23. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), the court considered
the validity of a bfoq defense under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which has an
identical provision. The court held that:
ITihe job qualifications which the employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be reason-
ably necessary to the essence of his business-here, the safe transportation of bus passengers
from one point to another. The greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm
... in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure
safe driving.
531 F.2d at 236 (emphasis in original).
26. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F2d at 235.
27. Id. at n. 5.
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defense is on the ability of the individual employee to perform the job. If
the employee is capable of performing it safely and efficiently the defense
has generally been held not to lie. This highlights the difficulty of utiliz-
ing the bfoq as a defense to the hiring of women of childbearing age in a
potentially toxic environment. The employer is not attempting to show
that the woman is unqualified; it is relying on the potential for harm to a
third person.
B. Business Necessity
When a facially neutral employment policy has a disparate impact on a
protected group, it must be justified by business necessity. The seminal
case, Giggs v. Duke Powers Co., established the principle that "if an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude [the protected group] can-
not be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."2" The touchstone here, as with the bfoq, is on necessity.
The employer must show that the qualification bears "a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was
used."
29
Proof of sex discrimination under adverse impact theory proceeds in
tripartite fashion: the female claimant would have to show, usually
through the use of statistical data, that a facially neutral policy had a
disproportionate, negative impact on women; the employer would then
have to show the existence of a compelling relationship between the qual-
ification and job performance; and the burden would then shift back to
the plaintiff to establish that there were alternative methods with less
discriminatory impact. 0
Thus, the courts have two established theories of discrimination to an-
alyze sex discrimination claims arising out of exclusion of women from
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
29. Id.
30. Although the Supreme Court has never defined "business necessity" with precision, it
seems clear that the mere fact that the policy is reasonable will not suffice. See, for example,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 331. where the court noted that the employer produced no evi-
dence correlating height and weight requirements for maximum security prison guards with attrib-
utes "essential to good job performance."
In discussing the cases developing the business necessity defense in the context of racial discrimina-
tion in Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation, 444 F2d 791 (4th Cir.), cer. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971) the Fourth Circuit stated:
Collectively these cases conclusively establish that the applicable test is not merely whether there
exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any
racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better
accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
racial impact.
Id. at 798 (footnote ommited).
7
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the potentially toxic workplace. Neither, however, is a perfect fit: the
bfoq defense appears inappropriate because of its traditional focus on the
ability of the employee to perform the job; and business necessity seems
inapplicable because it is predicated on the existence of a facially neutral
policy, which pregnancy classifications by definition cannot be. The
three federal courts of appeal to have addressed the issue have elected to
utilize a modified adverse impact analysis.
C. Zuniga v. Kleburg County Hospital31
Rita Zuniga was the first female x-ray technician hired by the defend-
ant hospital. 2 When she became pregnant, she was told that she would
have to either resign or be fired. 3 The hospital administrator informed
her that she would not be granted a leave of absence, nor entitled to
either sick leave, the maternity benefits generally available to female em-
ployees, nor her Blue Cross Blue Shield coverage, and that she could not
be guaranteed reemployment after the baby's birth.' There was no writ-
ten policy so providing; the decision was based solely on the administra-
tor's concern over the potentially damaging effects of x-ray radiation on
the fetus and resulting liability.35 The hospital's discretionary leave pol-
icy, applicable to all other employees, guaranteed their jobs upon
return.
36
After trial, the district court entered judgment for the hospital, con-
cluding that Zuniga had not been discriminated against on the basis of
sex. The court further found that the hospital's policy of dismissing
pregnant x-ray technicians was the only way it could carry out its legiti-
mate business purposes.
37
The Fifth Circuit reversed.38 It noted initially that the events in ques-
tion occurred prior to the amendment of Title VII to include pregnancy
as a protected basis; thus the Gilbert holding that pregnancy distinctions
are not facially sex-based applied. 39 The Fifth Circuit went on to find,
however, that rather than merely withholding from women benefits that
men could not enjoy, the hospital's decision imposed a substantial bur-
den on women that men need not suffer, as in Satty.4° The Court found
it "difficult to conceive of a more straightforward prima facie case of sex
31. 692 F2d 986 (Sth Cir. 1982).
32. Id. at 987.




37. Id. at 989.
38. Id. at 994.
39. Id. at 989.
40. Id. at 991.
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discrimination under 703(aX2)," 4 the disparate impact provision. It
then considered whether the hospital had made the requisite showing of
business necessity, and concluded that it had not. 42 The Court found it
unnecessary to decide whether the business necessity defense reaches
preservation of fetal health and the avoidance of tort liability.43 Zuniga
would prevail because it was clear that the hospital failed to utilize an
alternative, less discriminatory means of achieving its ends: the hospital
could have protected itself, the fetus and Zuniga's employment prospects
by following its own established leave policies." There was no adequate
showing that Zuniga could not have been temporarily replaced and
granted a discretionary leave of absence.4"
The result in Zuniga seems preordained by the fact that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was inapplicable. If pregnancy is not considered a
facially sex-based classification, then disparate impact, depending as it
does on the existence of a facially neutral policy, becomes the appropriate
analysis. The Fourth Circuit, in considering a similar issue the same
year, could not rely on the same presumption.
D. Wright v. Olin Corporation 46
In 1978, the year that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act brought
pregnancy within the scope of Title VII protection, Olin Corporation
adopted a "female employment and fetal vulnerability program which
created three job classifications: 1) unrestricted jobs, which presented no
hazard to the pregnant female or fetus; 2) controlled jobs, which might
require limited contact with harmful chemicals; and 3) restricted jobs,
which 'may require contact with and exposure to known or suspected
abortifacient or teratogenic agents.' " Unrestricted jobs were open to
all women.48 Controlled jobs were limited to nonpregnant women who
signed a form stating their awareness of the existence of some risk.' 9 Re-
stricted jobs were closed to all fertile women." All women from ages 5
to 63 were considered to be fertile unless Olin's medical staff confirmed
their inability to have children.5 Of the approximately 265 job classifica-
tions at the plant, twelve were placed in the restricted category and a
significant number were controlled. Five of eleven lines of progression
41. Id at n.8. See also Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
42. Id. at 992.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 994.
45. Id. at 993.
46. 697 F.2d. 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
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were affected.s
2
Three Olin employees, two doctors and one lay person, testified in sup-
port of the program- 3 Based on their review of the medical literature,
they concluded that the program was necessary to protect fetuses from
exposure to certain toxic chemicals, particularly lead, used in the plant's
manufacturing processes.- These witnesses, none of whom were recog-
nized as experts in the field, testified that no less restrictive alternatives,
such as improving ventilation or providing personal protection devices,
were feasible."
In considering the legality of the program, the court noted that its first
task was to determine the appropriate analytical framework-a point of
considerable conflict between the parties.5 The female claimants ini-
tially argued a hybrid theory that at least ostensibly appears to best re-
flect the changed treatment of pregnancy classifications." They
suggested that disparate impact theory would apply until October 31,
1978, the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and bfoq
theory thereafter, since as of that date the program became one of overt
sex discrimination."8 The Court in a footnote dismissed the argument
without discussion.5 9 It acknowledged that the issue did not fit with pre-
cision into any of the developed theories,' but concluded that a disparate
impact/business necessity analysis "is best suited for a principled appli-
cation of Title VII doctrine to the fetal vulnerability program.""
The Court gave short shrift to the discrepancy highlighted by the
claimants; that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act eliminated any argu-
ment that pregnancy distinctions could be considered neutral. Without
referring to the applicability of the amendment, it noted only that
"[w]hile the 'facial neutrality' of Olin's fetal vulnerability program might
be subject to logical dispute, the dispute would involve mere semantic
quibbling..."6 The court quite candidly gave as its reason for not utiliz-
ing the seemingly more appropriate bfoq defense the fact that the em-
ployer could not possibly meet it:
The inappropriateness of applying the overt discrimination/bfoq theory
of claim and defense--or, more accurately, of treating it as the exclu-





56. d. at 1183.
57. Id., n. 17.
58. Id. at 1183, fn. 17.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1184.
61. Id. at 1185.
62. Id. at 1186.
10
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would prevent the employer from asserting a justification defense which
under developed Title VII doctrine it is entitled to present' 3 ;
Having decided that disparate impact was the more appropriate analysis,
the court then discussed whether Olin had established business necessity.
The Court noted that the fetal vulnerability issue was one of first impres-
sion and that the defense as traditionally interpreted would have to be
adjusted in order to be applicable. It therefore remanded for further pro-
ceedings on the narrow issue of whether business necessity was shown."
Pointing out that the concept of business necessity had already been ex-
tended to embrace considerations of workplace safety in other contexts,
the Court went on to analogize the emp!oyer's interest in the safety of the
fetus with its legally recognized interest in protecting the safety of cus-
tomers.6 5 The Court concluded that an employer could establish a busi-
ness necessity defense to the imposition of otherwise prohibited
restrictions on the employment opportunities of women based on the
need to protect the health of unborn children, and set out principles to be
considered in determining whether the employer had met its burden of
proof. The burden of persuasion is on the employer to prove by in-
dependent, objective evidence that a significant risk of fetal harm exists,
that the hazard is such that women, but not men, need protection, and
that the program devised is tailored to that purpose." Once the em-
ployer establishes these elements of proof, the claimant can rebut by
showing the existence of alternatives that would accomplish the same
results with less discriminatory impacL'
E. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital"
The Eleventh Circuit was the last to consider fetal vulnerability in the
context of a Title VII challenge, and it did so after the passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The facts in Hayes are virtually identical
to those in Zuniga. The defendant hospital fired Hayes, a female x-ray
technician, after learning that she was pregnant, claiming that it could
not find alternative employment for her." Hayes brought suit alleging
Title VII as well as constitutional violations.' The district court found
in her favor, and the hospital appealed."'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.1 It recognized that Title VII as
63. Id. at I185, n. 21.
64. Id. at 1187.
65. Id. at 1188.
66. Id. at 1189-90.
67. Id. at 1191.
68. 726 F2d 1543 (11th Cir.). rehg denied. 732 F2d 944 (1984).
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amended "... mandates that a pregnancy-based rule can never be neu-
tral,""3 and that firing Hayes because she was pregnant was therefore
facially discriminatory. 4 The Court nevertheless rejected Hayes' argu-
ment that the only affirmative defense available to the hospital would be
the existence of a bfoq.-s Instead, it decided that the fact that an em-
ployer's policy applies only to pregnant women creates a presumption of
facial discrimination which the employer can rebut by showing that even
though applicable only to women, the policy is neutral in the sense that it
protects the offspring of all employees.'
6
The Court then went on to adopt a version of the requirements set out
in Olin: 1) that the employer produce objective, scientific evidence that
there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus or potential offspring of
women employees from the women's exposure to toxic hazards in the
workplace, and 2) that the hazard applies to fertile or pregnant women,
but not to men." The Court did not appear to recognize the inconsis-
tency in requiring as a condition of establishing facial neutrality that a
policy affect members of one sex only. Nor did it mention the third Olin
requirement-that the policy be effective in protecting against the risk.
The Court acknowledges as the reason for its reluctance to find facial
discrimination the fact that ".. .when a policy designed to protect em-
ployee offspring from workplace hazards proves facially discriminatory,
there is, in effect, no defense..
The Court then considered whether the Hospital had rebutted the pre-
sumption of facial discrimination, and concluded that it had not." The
Hospital failed to meet the threshold requirement of proving that the x-
ray radiation to which Hayes would be exposed posed a significant risk of
harm to her fetus.' The medical testimony introduced at trial estab-
lished that Hayes, as a night technician, was unlikely to ever be exposed
to levels of radiation in excess of those considered safe by the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements."' Further, even if
the levels of radiation to which she would be exposed were to exceed the
safe range, the Hospital would still have the heavy burden of proving
that no alternative positions were available. 2
Despite concluding that facial discrimination existed and that a bfoq
could not be established, which should have ended the inquiry, the Court
73. Id. at 1547.




78. Id. at 1549.
79. Id. at 1551.
80. Id. at 1550.
81. Id. at 1551.
82. Id.
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nevertheless went on to consider Hayes' claim under disparate impact
theory."3 The Court decided that a disparate impact claim automatically
existed because the policy affected only women." Further, it found that
a business necessity defense was also automatically established.. 5 "That
is because to reach the disparate impact stage of analysis in a fetal protec-
tion case, the employer has already proved-to overcome the presump-
tion of facial discrimination-that its policy is justified on a scientific
basis and addresses a harm that does not affect men. To add any more
requirements would be to render it nearly impossible to have a fetal pro-
tection program under any circumstances."" Even though under the
Court's analysis business necessity was established, Hayes would still
prevail because of the Hospital's failure to explore less discriminatory
alternatives-other duties within the hospital that Hayes could perform.
Although the policy is cast as one of facial discrimination, the lan-
guage of the decision tracts disparate impact theory almost exclusively.
Thus, the analysis comes full circle. By paraphrasing the Olin require-
ments for business necessity and finding they demonstrate facial neutral-
ity, the court allows a claim of facially discriminatory conduct to be
rebutted by a showing less than that required to sustain a bfoq.
As a result of the decision, an employer can apply a business necessity
defense to a policy based expressly on pregnancy despite the passage of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
PART III: THE EEOC POSITON: THEN AND Now
In February of 1980, the EEOC published proposed Interpretive
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards
in the Federal Register for notice and comment.87 The proposed 1980
guidelines were the joint effort of the EEOC and the Department of La-
bor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)." They took
the position that an employer or contractor may not have a plan designed
to protect employees from reproductive hazards that negatively affects
their employment opportunities specifically on the basis of sex. Such pol-
icies were deemed discriminatory on their face.89
The proposed 1980 guidelines went on to provide, however, that an
83. Id. at 1552.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1553.
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980)
88. OFCCP Administers Executive Order 11246. 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), which provides
that contractors may not discriminate against e)-:loyees on the basis of race, color. religion, sex or
national origin.
89. 45 Fed. Reg. at 7516.
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employer could establish a neutral policy to protect all its employees
from reproductive hazards, but if it had an adverse impact or one sex, it
would have to be justified by business necessity." Nine factors are listed
as relevant to an inquiry as to whether business necessity was established:
1) whether the employer's policy was applied consistently to employ-
ees of both sexes,
2) whether the employer has complied with applicable occupational
safety and health laws;
3) whether the employer has investigated the effects of all the known
hazards in its workplace and relied on reputable scientific evidence
in developing its plan;
4) whether the threat from exposure is greater to the sex affected by
the policy than to that not affected;
5) whether there is any evidence of discriminatory practices prior to
the implementation of the plan;
6) whether the plan defines the affected class as narrowly as is feasi-
ble given the scope of the risk;
7) whether there is evidence that the hazard poses a threat to bodily
systems other than the reproductive system;
8) whether the employer considered less discriminatory alternatives
such as the use of protective devices; and
9) whether the employer is monitoring scientific developments that
may affect the effectiveness of the policy."'
The 1980 guidelines provided for the availabiity of technical assist-
ance from OSHA and also allowed an employer to utilize a temporary
emergency exclusion pending the securing of scientific evidence where it
appeared that a hazard might cause significant and immediate harm."2
The explanatory note to the 1980 guidelines made two additional
points. First, it took the position that the bfoq exception does not apply
to the analysis of issues involving fetal and reproductive hazards. The
note stated that the narrow bfoq exception pertains only to those situa-
tions where all or substantially all of a protected class are unable to per-
form the duties of the job in question. In this context, the exclusion is
based on the existence of a threat to the employee or fetus, not the em-
ployee's ability to perform.9 3
Secondly, it was noted that the 1980 guidelines did not preclude an
employer from temporarily removing employees of both sexes from work
areas where reproductive hazards might exist.94
90. Id.
91. 45 Fed. Reg. 7517.
92. Id.
93. 45 Fed. Reg. 7516.
94. Id.
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Numerous comments were received on the proposed Guidelines, most
of them critical, and they were subsequently withdrawn." EEOC and
OFCCP stated in the notice of withdrawal that the complexity of the
issue suggested the need for consideration of facts on a case-by-case
basis. 6
Effective October 7, 1988, the EEOC implemented new policy gui-
dance on reproductive and fetal hazards.' In the interim between the
issuance of the two statements, the three Courts of Appeals' cases had
been decided. The 1988 Policy Guidance purports to be an elaboration
of the analytical framework adopted by those courts. Perhaps for that
reason, a determination of the appropriate theory for considering repro-
ductive hazard cases receives little attention. The EEOC simply states
that "[a]lthough the BFOQ defense is normally the only one available in
cases of overt discrimination, the Commission follows the lead of every
court of appeals to have addressed the question ... and concluded that
the business necessity defense applies. ."I" Within that framework the
employer must prove 1) whether there is a substantial risk of harm to
offspring of employees through exposure to hazards in the workplace; 2)
whether the harm takes place through the exposure of one sex but not
the other; and 3) whether the employer's policy effectively eliminates the
risk." The EEOC goes on to state that even if these elements are proved
the policy will be considered invalid if a reasonable alternative with less
discriminatory impact is shown. If such an alternative exists, it must be
used. Possible alternatives would include protective devices or tech-
niques, and also temporary or permanent transfers or reassignments. 10°
Whenever possible, the EEOC will defer to OSHA's opinion as to the
existence of a risk of harm, and whether the employer's policy effectively
reduces the level of risk.10 1
Several provisions of the former Guidelines are not included in the
recent version. The new Guidance does not state that expressly sex-
based policies are discriminatory on their face. They do not take the
position that the bfoq defense is inapplicable. Moreover, there is no sug-
gestion that the employer might bring itself into compliance by tempo-
rarily removing members of both sexes from the hazardous area.
The procedural posture of the two statements also differs. The 1980
Guidelines were promulgated in conjunction with OFCCP and OSHA.
95. 46 Fed Reg. 3916 (1981).
96. Id.
97. EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. II, Section 624, Reproductive and Fetal Hazards; Gui-
dance Number 915, 034, October 7. 1988, p.l.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 9. citing EEOC Compliance Manual section 624.7(1), alternative.
101. Id. at 8.
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They were published in the Federal Register for notice and comment.
The 1988 Policy Guidance was issued unilaterally, and was adopted as
the agency's interpretation without the customary publication for notice
and comment.
PART IV: RETURNING TO THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE VII
The starting point of any attempt to resolve this issue should be the
language of the statute. Section 701(k) 02 expressly provides that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination on the
basis of sex. In amending Title VII to so state, Congress removed the
underpinning of any argument that a pregnancy-based policy is neutral.
If the policy is not neutral, but facially discriminatory, the number of
exceptions or defenses available is limited. Section 703(e) permits sex to
become an employment criterion only where it is "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."' 3 As
written, the statutory language, while narrow, would appear to allow an
employer to demonstrate, for example, that the potential for liability to a
large number of affected offspring would jeopardize its solvency. As in-
terpreted, the bfoq defense has been narrowed further to apply to only
those situations in which all or substantially all women are unable to
perform the duties of the job. ° 4
Neither the three Courts of Appeals' decisions nor EEOC's Policy
Guidance state that the bfoq defense cannot be applied. The Courts
decline to apply it because of their view that it would result in automatic
employer liability in a situation where the policy serves a social good.
The softening of the EEOC's position from 1980 to 1989 may also reflect
a growing concern for the tenuousness of the employer's position, in hav-
ing to provide equal employment opportunity on the one hand, yet pro-
tect itself from the liability of injured offspring. This concern, however,
overlooks a critical fact: if one asks why automatic liability results, the
answer would seem to be that it stems from the structuring of a plan in
terms of sex, not risk. It is, in fact, an overstatement to say that the
actions in Zuniga and Hayes were taken pursuant to a "plan." The deci-
sions in those cases were ad hoc determinations by individual supervisors
based on the largely subjective belief that any x-ray radiation is harmful
to a pregnant female. Only the Olin "plan" qualified as such, and it was
specifically labeled a "female employment and fetal vuhierability" pro-
gram and developed by three non-experts in the field.'0"
Even where there is a formal plan, employers tend toward overinclu-
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
104. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital. 726 F.2d at 1549.
105. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d at 1182 emphasis added
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siveness. The Olin plan, for example, applied to all females between the
ages of 5 and 63.'1" There seems to be little empirical support for fram-
ing exclusionary policies that broadly. It is unlikely that there are any
five year olds in the workforce, and women beyond the age of fifty are far
less likely to conceive.' 07 Moreover, there are women in the twenty to
forty year old group who because of choice, incapacity, or sexual prefer-
ence will not bear children.' An employer could narrow its policy on
those grounds alone.
Employers may be tempted to draft broad policies because the parame-
ters of risk from workplace hazards are as yet unclear. As the EEOC
recognizes, the evaluation of risk is difficult because evidence of repro-
ductive harm at this point is "largely inconclusive."' 109 The Hayes Court,
after listening to testimony that any dose of radiation is excessive, to the
point that it is dangerous for a pregnant woman to sunbathe in a bathing
suit, concluded that "... scientists know little about the detrimental ef-
fects of even the lowest levels of radiation."' 10 There is an even greater
uncertainty as to the risk of harm to offspring resulting from exposure of
the male reproductive system."'
In view of the current state of scientific knowledge, it is arguable that
exclusionary policies framed in terms of sex should have to show that
they are reasonably necessary to the operation of the business, for several
reasons: 1] by simply tracking the interpretation of the bfoq defense
under the Age Discrimination Employment Act, the test can also be met
in the reproductive hazard context; 2] the hybridized business defense as
set forth in Hayes and the EEOC Policy Guidance is not as lenient as it
might appear at first glance; 3] to the extent that the bfoq exception is
more stringent, it provides greater incentive for the employer to narrowly
tailor any exclusionary policy to meet the risk; and 4] focusing on the
general rules applicable to facial discrimination would not result in a de
facto overturning of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Although the formulations differ somewhat, it is universally recog-
nized that the bfoq exception is meant to be extremely narrow. 112 In one
of the most frequently cited cases, the Fifth Circuit held that an em-
106. Id.
107. See Beck, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Chli. L Rev.
1219, 1233 (1986), noting that for blue collar women over the age of 30, the birth rate may be les
that 2%. and only one in 5,000 women.
108. EEOC Policy Guidance Number 915, 034. October 7, 1988. at 7, n. 16.
109. EEOC Policy Guidance Number 915.034, October 7, 1988, at 7-8; citing the office of Tech-
nology Assessment U.S. Congress, Reproductive Health Hazards in the Worplace 67-68 (1985).
110. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital. 726 F.2d at 1550.
1ll. See, e.&, International Union v. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wisc. 1988)
where the Court upheld an exclusionary policy from women in the face of testimony about rush of
harm to a fetus through the male.
112. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 US at 333; see afro legislative history at 110 Cong. Rec. 7213.
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ployer could rely on a bfoq exception only by proving "that he had rea-
sonable basis to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved."' 13 Subsequent formulations focusing on
the woman's ability to perform tend to either read the "safely" language
as applying only to the safety of the woman, or to read it out altogether.
Yet in cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, safety to
the public is a major factor in determining the applicability of a bfoq.
In Western Air Lines v Criswell, the Supreme Court considered
whether being under the age of 60 was a bfoq for the position of flight
engineer. "4 The Court recognized that suspect classifications such as sex
may be used only when the employer is compelled to rely on sex as a
proxy for safety-related considerations" 5. This could be established
either by showing a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
women could not safely and efficiently perform, or that the sex was a
legitimate proxy for safety because it would be virtually impossible to
make individualized determinations." 1
6
If the safety of the public is a legitimate consideration in determining
the applicability of the bfoq defense, then the personal safety of the wo-
man is not the only focus; the safety of others is also a relevant concern.
That same concern would justify considering the safety of potential off-
spring. Under such an analysis, the employer could meet the bfoq re-
quirements of showing that sex is a proxy for safety considerations,
including safety to the fetus, if the "all or substantially all women" lan-
guage were interpreted to mean all those covered by the employer's plan.
The employer would have to show either that all or substantially all wo-
men covered by the exclusionary policy would be unable to perform the
job without jeopardizing their safety or that of the fetus, or that treating
the class of women covered by the plan differently is necessary because of
the difficulty of making determinations on an individualized basis.
Although this is a modified reading of the bfoq defense, it requires less
tinkering with the language of the statute and traditional Title VII theory
than the revised business necessity approach of Hayes and the EEOC.
Although the bfoq test is a strict one, the standards set out by the
EEOC and the courts are by no means lenient. In order to establish
business necessity under the EEOC Guidance the employee must prove
that the harm to the offspring takes place through the exposure of mem-
bers of one sex only." I Even if that is shown, the policy is still vulnera-
113. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d at 235.
114. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
115. Id. at 414.
116. Id.
117. EEOC Policy Guidance Number 915, 034, October 7. 1988, at 5.
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ble if less discriminatory alternatives are available." I Under Hayes, the
business necessity defense cannot be invoked unless the employer can
show that the policy is neutral in the sense that it protects the offspring of
all employees equally." 9 There, too, the plaintiff could rebut by showing
that less discriminatory alternatives exist. Neither the EEOC Guidance
nor the decisions impose cost limitations on the avalls bility of alterna-
tives, although the Guidance does speak of an alternative policy that is
"reasonable."'' 20 The Guidance also specifically provides that transfers
and reassignments, presumably with no loss in pay, will be considered
reasonable.
12'
Since even the business necessity defense as articulated requires a
showing that only one sex is affected, something that the current state of
scientific knowledge would be hard pressed to do with any degree of cer-
tainty, there would seem to be little advantage in ignoring plain statutory
language and case law interpreting both defenses to reach the result in
Hayes. Assuming that the employer could document the existence of a
risk affecting members of one sex only, it is hard to imagine many situa-
tions in which it will able to show that no temporary transfer or reassign-
ment was available. Of course, if an employer can frame a policy in
terms of actual risk to bodily systems, it would presumably be considered
gender-neutral and traditional business necessity analysis would apply.
If the employer cannot do so and prefers to limit its policies to pregnant
or fertile women without exploring the possibility that the class can be
narrowed, then it is arguable that the employer should have to assume
the burden of showing that the classification is reasonably necessary to
the operation of its business. Otherwise, the employer has little incentive
not to overinclude.
To the extent that the bfoq exception is more stringent than the
EEOC/Hayes test, it should encourage employers to do the research and
obtain the medical data necessary to tailor any exclusionary policy as
narrowly as is possible and needed to address and perhaps correct the
hazards within the workplace. The EEOC Policy Guidance notes that
"[t]he same impulse that has led some employers to exaggerate the risks
of employing handicapped workers can also lead to exaggeration of risk
to offspring."'" Having to justify its classification as a proxy for safety
to offspring should discourage employers from too-quickly adopting a
plan excluding all women of child-bearing capacity from certain jobs.
This revisionist bfoq approach is more consistent with the language of
Title VII and the prevailing construction of both defenses. The Preg-
118. Id.
119. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d at 1548.
120. EEOC Policy Guidance Number 915. 034. October 7, 1988 at 9.
121. IML
122. Id. at 6, n. 16.
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nancy Discrimination Act was passed to prohibit just such a conclusion
that a policy which only applies to pregnant women can ever be gender-
neutral. Although the EEOC and the courts could, and did, revise the
business necessity defense to fit a reproductive hazard claim, they could
not transform an instance of the clearest kind of facial discrimination
into adverse impact.
CONCLUSION
In order to implement a plan excluding women of childbearing age
from certain jobs, an employer should have to show either that most of
the women covered would be unable to perform it without jeopardizing
their ability to bear children or that it would be highly impractical to
determine which ones would be affected on an individual basis. Requir-
ing an employer to meet the public safety criteria of the bfoq defense has
two salutory results. First, it comports with the legal reality that preg-
nancy classifications cannot be neutral. Second, it compels the employer
to acquire the empirical data necessary to tailor the plan to fit the need,
given the toxins present in the particular workplace. Employers should
have some latitude in fashioning policies to protect the health of unborn
children. But that latitude must be kept within narrow bounds so that it
does not become impermissible discrimination.
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